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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 14 provides for direct review of a 
decision or order of an administrative agency. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
ISSUE NUMBER 1. Whether the Utah State Retirement Board unconstitutionally 
deprived Appellant of due process under Article 1, §7 of the Utah Constitution, and under 
Section 1 of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution by striping her of the 
survivor annuity of her deceased husband without notice or opportunity to be heard. 
ISSUE NUMBER 2. Whether the Utah State Retirement Board unconstitutionally 
deprived Appellant of due process under Article 1, §7 of the Utah Constitution, and under 
the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution by failing to provide notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, prior to accepting and/or approving of her husband's election of 
Plan 1 which purportedly divested her of the survivor annuity. 
ISSUE NUMBER 3. Whether the Utah State Retirement Board failed to follow its own 
statutory scheme in Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-405(2), by failing to accord Appellant her 
request to treat her husband's election as though it had been made under Plan 3. 
1 
Statement Of Grounds For Seeking Review Of Constitutional Issues Not Raised 
Below (Issue Numbers 1, 2 and 3). See Section VII of this appellate brief which is 
incorporated in full at this point. Under State of Utah v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 
(Utah App. 1991), the Court of Appeals may consider a constitutional issue for the first 
time on appeal in the interests of justice, plain error, or exceptional circumstances. 
Appellant meets all three tests. 
ISSUE NUMBER 4. Whether the hearing officer failed to make the requisite finding of 
fact that the deceased Montierth mistakenly elected Plan 1, rather than Plan 3. 
Demonstration That Issue Number 4 Was Preserved Below, (See Request for Board 
Reconsideration, October 27, 2005) 
ISSUE NUMBER 5. Whether the Application for Service Retirement, form RTRT-3, 
signed by Appellant's husband on August 16, 2002, is legally binding given the fact that 
it is unsigned by a Board representative or the decedent. Demonstration That Issue 
Number 5 Was Preserved Below. (See Petitioner's Request for Board Action and 
attachments, March 21, 2005) 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
With regard to Issue Numbers 1, 2 and 3, whether an administrative agency has 
afforded a party due process is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Color 
County Management v. Labor Commission, 38 P.3d 969 (Utah App. 2000). 
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With respect to findings of fact (Issue Number 4), the reviewing court examines 
the record to determine if the findings are supported by substantial evidence when viewed 
in light of the whole record before the court. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g). 
With regard to Issue umber 5, the standard of review of agency actions dealing 
with statutory interpretation is an issue of law, and thus is a "correction-of-error" review; 
no deference is paid to agency conclusions. Gottfredson v. Utah State Retirement Board, 
808 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah App. 1991). 
With respect to Issue Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, regarding challenges based on 
arbitrary or capricious agency action, the standard of review is reasonableness and 
rationality. R.O.A. General, Inc. v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 966 P.2d 840, 842 
(Utah 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WHOSE 
INTERPRETATION ARE DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7. 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1. 
STATUTE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405(2) provides: "(2) Upon the request of a deceased 
member's lawful spouse at the time of the member's death, the deceased member is 
considered to have retired under Option Three . . . . " 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Wesley Montierth, the deceased husband of Appellant, was a high school math 
teacher at Davis High School (R.T. 5), and a member of the Public Employees 
Noncontributory Retirement System (PERS). On August 16, 2002, he filled out an 
Application for Service Retirement, form RTRT-3, checking Plan 1 (Addendum 1). 
Plan 1 ostensibly does not provide a survivor annuity to the non-employee spouse upon 
the employee's death. Appellant was completely unaware of her husband's choice 
having never seen the Application for Service Retirement form (R.T. 13). The 
application was never properly completed; specifically there is no state or employee 
signature attesting to the requirement that the plans were explained to Mr. Montierth as 
required on Page 2 of the form (Addendum 1). Mr. Montierth committed suicide on 
October 20, 2004 (R.T. 7, 8). Upon learning that the Plan refused to provide her with 
survivor benefits, on February 22, 2005, Appellant formally requested the Board to 
change her husband's retirement benefit election from Plan 1 to Plan 3, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §49-13-405(2) (Ltr. of February 15, 2005, Crofts to Newman). The request 
was denied by Robert V. Newman, Executive Director of the Plan on February 22, 2005 
(Ltr. from Newman to Crofts). 
On August 22, 2005, a hearing was held before ALJ James L. Barker, Jr. On 
October 13, 2005, the Utah Retirement Board adopted the findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and order of denial of the ALJ. A Petition for Review was lodged on October 14, 
2005, and a Docketing Statement filed on December 1, 2005. An October 27, 2005 
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Request for Reconsideration was denied on December 8, 2005. Amended Docketing 
Statements were filed on December 8, 2005 and January 24, 2006. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appears to be a case of first impression. A widow and her four minor 
children stand to lose over $800,000 in survivor annuity benefits, their umbilical cord to 
life support, because of the state's unconstitutional denial of Appellant's due process 
right to notice, and opportunity to be heard, prior to stripping her of her vested property 
rights in the survivor annuity. 
Errors by the Plan administrators, who, as trustees and fiduciaries, under both state 
and federal law, owe a fiduciary duty to Appellant, are clear, identifiable and egregious. 
First, the Board never informed the Appellant of the choices available for retirement 
benefits even though she legally was an equal "owner" of the benefit. Second, the 
Application for Service Retirement form is completely lacking in execution, since the 
required signature of a state representative or Appellant's husband ~ attesting to the fact 
that the six retirement plan options had been explained - is missing from Page 2 of the 
document. Third, and assuming, as the Board argued below, that Mr. Montierth 
knowingly and without mistake, (although the uncontradicted evidence shows otherwise), 
elected a plan that disenfranchised his spouse and four minor children of a lifetime 
annuity, the State failed to so notify the Appellant and provide her an opportunity to 
contest her husband's election at the time it was being made. Not only is this lack of 
notice unconstitutional, it eviscerates and nullifies a longstanding line of cases in Utah 
5 
requiring that a waiver by a spouse to retirement benefits be clear, specific and 
unmistakable. Finally, it refused to allow her the opportunity to exercise her post-death 
right to convert the Retirement Election to Plan 3 as provided in §49-13-405(2). 
During the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge did not credit Mrs. Montierth's 
uncontested testimony that her husband's intent was to elect a plan that provided for the 
survivor annuity based upon his assurances that she would receive one. The ALJ 
devalued the testimony because of its hearsay character, all in disregard of explicit 
instructions by Utah courts that the hearsay rule is not to be strictly followed in 
administrative hearings. 
Accordingly, both in its statutory and regulatory architecture, as well as in its 
administration, PERS is unconstitutional in that it deprives a non-employee spouse of a 
clear vested property right without due process notice and opportunity to be heard. The 
Board not only unconstitutionally has deprived Appellant of her lifeline to economic 
support, it has reaped an unconscionable forfeiture and windfall of some $800,000. To 
the extent that the constitutional issues were not raised below, we petition the Court to 
consider them on appeal in order to correct plain error and manifest injustice as it may do 
so under State of Utah v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991). In this respect, it 
realistically cannot be argued that the Board, who acts as its own adjudicative tribunal, 
would have entertained fairly an argument that it had acted unconstitutionally. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PETITIONER HAS A VESTED PROPERTY INTEREST IN THE 
SURVIVOR ANNUITY OF HER DECEASED HUSBAND. 
A logical predicate to advancing a denial of due process claim, whether 
procedurally or substantively, is a showing that the Appellant has a recognizable interest 
in the property deprived. In Utah, and in this particular context, that proposition seems 
unassailable. 
In In re Marriage of Brown, 15 CaL3d 838, 544 P.2d 561 (1976), the seminal case 
in the area, after an exhaustive analysis of what the term "vested" means in a 
retirement/pension context, the California Supreme Court held: "Pension rights whether 
or not vested represent a property interest. . . they comprise a community asset subject to 
division in a dissolution proceeding." Id. at 562-63. Just six years later, in Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), the keystone retirement benefit case in Utah, the 
Utah court cited and followed In re Marriage o/Brown, as it specifically considered 
whether a wife has a vested interest in her husband's retirement benefits and secondarily, 
whether the term "vested" has any significance in defining what is a "property interest." 
After surveying the status of the law in California and other jurisdictions it held: 
In the context of Utah law, we find it unnecessary to 
consider whether or not the pension benefits are "vested or 
not vested". 
We agree that this concept of vesting is an 
inappropriate basis for determining what property should be 
subject to equitable division in a divorce proceeding. 
If the rights to [retirement benefits] are acquired 
during the marriage, then the court must at least consider 
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those benefits in making an equitable distribution of marital 
assets. 
Id. at 432-433. 
To the same effect, see Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988); Estate of 
Frank Annelo, Jr. v. McQueen, et aL, 953 P.2d 1143 (Utah 1998); and Culbertson v. 
Continental Assurance Co., 631 P.2d 906 (Utah 1981). The same is true with 
government sponsored plans. See Greene v. Greene, 751 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah App. 
1988): "Military retirement benefits accrued in whole or in part during marriage 
constitute mutual property under Utah law and are subject to division in a divorce 
proceeding." 
As we examine the legislative scheme under PERS, the Utah legislature 
specifically recognized a spouse's inalienable property interest in her husband's 
retirement benefit upon death. First, the statutory architecture contains an expansive 
definition of "beneficiary" and "member." Under Section 49-11-102, "Beneficiary" 
means any person entitled to receive payment through relationship or a person designated 
by a member. "Member" includes a spouse of retiree. Section 49-11-609. Section 49-13-
405 dealing with the death of married members, provides: 
(1) As used in this section, "members full allowance" means Option Three 
calculated under Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-402 without an actuarial 
reduction. 
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(2) Upon the request of a deceased member's lawful spouse at the time of 
the member's death, the deceased member is considered to have retired 
under Option Three. 
Section 49-13-405(l)(2). The section then spells out the percentage of retirement benefit 
a surviving spouse would obtain depending on her husband's age and service years at the 
time of death. Section 49-13-405 can only be read as the legislature's attempt 
specifically to protect a surviving spouse in the event of her husband's death. And even 
more to the point, by this section, the legislature clearly recognized the vested interest a 
non-employee spouse has in the retirement benefit since she receives it simply by being 
married to the employee for six months. Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405(2)(b). 
II. UTAH COURTS HISTORICALLY HAVE DEMANDED CLEAR, SPECIFIC 
WAIVERS OF PROPERTY INTERESTS WHEN A SPOUSE MIGHT BE 
DIVESTED. 
In Estate of Frank Annelo, Jr. v. McQueen^ et al., 953 P.2d 1143 (Utah 1998), the 
Utah Supreme Court, per Justice Stewart, demonstrated the length to which Utah courts 
will go to protect the vested property interests of spouses. The context was a divorce 
proceeding and a mutually prepared settlement agreement. 
First, the court noted that divorce alone does not terminate a former spouse's 
rights as a survivor to a retirement benefit. Id. at 1145. Second, the court addressed both 
the nature of the interest a spouse must have in the property to make it a cognizable right, 
and the clarity of a waiver in said interest, in order to make it effective. "Thus, one who 
has an expectancy interest in an asset owned by a former spouse retains that interest 
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unless a property settlement or divorce decree evidences a clear intent to deprive that 
person of the expectancy interest. . . ." (emphasis added) Id. at 1145. The court went on 
to state that it must appear that the document explicitly focuses on survivorship interests 
or expectancies, that the disclaimer is clear; in effect there must be explicit language. 
Mat 1145. Similarly, in Culbertson v. Continental Assurance CoL, 631 P.2d 906 (Utah 
1981) the court held: "Unless there is in addition a specific provision in the decree or 
property settlement explicitly waiving the expectancy interest the former spouse is 
entitled to receive the proceeds of the designated beneficiary." Id at 912-913. 
The bottom line is obvious. In a divorce proceeding involving an expectancy 
interest, for example a retirement plan, of a spouse (usually the wife), wherein a division 
of property agreement is drafted, she cannot be deprived of her interest in the retirement 
plan without clear, explicit language to that effect. In contrast, here, neither the 
legislative scheme establishing the PERS annuity benefit nor in the Board's own pre-
retirement-election papers, particularly Form RTRT-3 (Application for Service 
Retirement), is there a single caution, or protective device to ensure a knowing waiver or 
consent by the non-employee spouse. Thus, we have the anomaly, in Utah, that the 
courts will exercise a sharp-penciled eye for specificity and clear waiver in a divorce 
proceeding (where both spouses have counsel and are fluent in the property), yet 
completely ignore that very same spousal right, when the spouse receives absolutely no 
notice that her property right is being extinguished, is completely unaware of Form 
RTRT-3, and, of course, authorizes no consent whatsoever. 
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III. PETITIONER HAS BEEN DEPRIVED OF PROPERTY IN VIOLATION OF 
THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS BY FAILLING TO 
PROVIDE NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, §7 mirrors the language of the 14 Amendment, 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, §1. In McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 85 P.2d 
608, 610 (Utah 1938), recently approved in Millers v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co^ et ai, 44 
P.3d 663, 676 (Utah 2002), the Court stated, referring to Article I, §7: "The term 
property in this clause embraces all valuable interests which a man may possess outside 
of himself... It is not confined to mere tangible property but extends to every species of 
a vested right." The court went on to observe that under Utah's open courts provision, 
Utah Constitution, Article I, §11, the courts are expressly open to every person for an 
injury done to his property. Id. at 673. Additionally, and almost without need to citation, 
"Every person who brings a claim in court or at a hearing held before an administrative 
agency has a due process right to receive a fair trial." Bunnell v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1987). 
The due process clauses in the 14 and 5 Amendments guarantee that each 
person will be accorded a certain process if they are about to be deprived of property. 
Nowak & Rotunda, Constitutional Law, 6th ed. (2000). The 14th Amendment specifically 
requires notice before property is taken. Id. at 587. The notice requirement runs from 
statutes to regulations to sales of property. Nowak & Rotunda, Treatise on Constitutional 
Law, 3d, 1999 . When a "governmental agency . . . considers terminating or impairing an 
individual's constitutionally cognizable . . . property interest, notice must be given to 
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individuals whose interest is at stake . . ." Id. at 107. The same guarantee of proper 
notice also runs to statutes which must be reasonably clear so that individuals have 
adequate notice as to the type of conduct regulated or prohibited. Id. at 104-105. And, 
when a statute regulates fundamental constitutional rights, the degree of notice provided 
must possess greater clarity and will be subject to close judicial scrutiny. Id. footnote 31 
at 105. Case in point: Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-402. It creates the six options here at 
issue, but does not provide any mechanism to alert the putative widow that she will be 
divested if her husband elects Plan 1. As we also argue below, any notion that the non-
employee spouse can be divested if her employee-husband elects Plan 1, seems internally 
contradicted by Section 49-13-405(2). 
Notice requirements run across the board. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652 (1950), whether notice by newspaper of 
judicial action was sufficient; Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 99 
L.Ed.2d 74 (1988) discussing the proper notice for default judgments. See Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding notice to class members. In United States v. 
James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993), in the setting 
of a civil forfeiture case, the court expressly held that the state could not seize real 
property without granting the owner notice and some type of hearing. 
The twin sister of notice, itself a fundamental prerequisite of due process, is the 
opportunity to be heard, a right which has little reality or value unless one is informed 
that the matter is pending and one can choose for himself whether to contest. 
Additionally, the notice must be of such a nature as reasonably to convey the required 
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information. Worrallv. Ogden City Fire Department, 616 P2d 598, 601 (Utah 1990). In 
T.H. v. State of Utah 86 P.3d 745, 748, the court held that for purposes of due process, 
the parties must receive notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise them of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections. See, Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 391 (Utah 
App. 1987) (issued in the background of claim preclusion) reaching the same conclusion; 
and 3D Construction and Development v. Old Standard, 117 P.3d 1082, 1087 (Utah 
2005). 
In Mathews v. Eldredge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 32, 41 (1976), in the 
context of termination of social security benefits, the Court observed: This Court 
consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally 
deprived of a property interest. . . "The fundamental requirement of due process is the 
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" 
(citations omitted). . . The essence of due process is the requirement that "a person in 
jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the [event] and an opportunity to meet it." 
Here, Appellant Montierth received nothing. She was completely unaware that the 
incorrect option had been selected in 2002, and she was never given an opportunity to 
contest, object or be heard on the subject. She simply lost her entire $800,000 without so 
much as a postcard. This abject failure of notice, which inherently is misleading, is not 
tolerated well by Utah courts. The courts have been specifically exacting on the 
Retirement Board to ensure that it does not mislead members, and diligently protects their 
interests. In Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671, 676 (Utah App. 
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1990), the court held that the Board "bears a stringent duty to abstain from giving 
inaccurate or misleading advice." Finally, the United States Supreme Court has strictly 
enforced the constitutional prerequisite of agency impartiality, particularly if the 
decision-maker has an interest in the outcome of the case. See, Nowak & Rotunda, 
Treatise on Constitutional Law, 3d, 1999 §17.8 at 100-101. While we do not suggest that 
the Board ruled against Appellant simply in order to save $800,000 from distribution, 
nevertheless given the pecuniary interest at stake, it makes the Board's fiduciary duty, 
and its handling of claims, more susceptible to close scrutiny by this Court and decidedly 
tips the balance of equities strongly in Montierth's favor. 
IV. THE BOARD FAILED TO FOLLOW THE SPIRIT AND LETER OF 
SECTION 49-13-405(2) 
As argued previously in Section I, the Utah Legislature specifically granted a 
surviving spouse the right unilaterally to select option three. "Upon the request of a 
deceased member's lawful spouse at the time of the member's death, the deceased 
member is considered to have retired under option three." Utah Code Ann. §49-13-
405(2). On its face section (2) has no qualifications or limitations. It does not limit the 
option to cases in which a Form RTRT-3 has not been executed; nor does it disqualify a 
member's spouse from so electing simply because the employee previously has retired. 
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the 
Legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. Sullivan v. Scoular 
Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, (Utah 1993). To discover intent, the court looks first to 
the plain language of the statute. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, (Utah 1993). In 
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construing a statute the court assumes that "each term in the statute was used advisedly; 
thus statutory words are read literally." Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 811 P.2d 664, (Utah 1991). Applying these historical rules of construction, 
the Appellant's 2005 "election" to treat her annuity as one under Plan 3 should have been 
honored forthwith. 
Undoubtedly, the State will argue that §49-13-405(2) was designed only for 
employees who died before they actually retired. Perhaps, but the statute is not so 
limiting. A better, equally realistic construction is that option one, under §49-13-402, 
was for bachelors or widowers who had no need for a survivor benefit. But assuming 
arguendo that §49-13-405(2) is only available to pre-retirees, we are faced with yet 
another anomaly: Non-employee spouses whose husbands have never exercised the 
RTRT-3 option are fully protected, yet wives of employees who have mistakenly, or 
deliberately, disenfranchised them, without notice or knowledge, are left impecunious. 
V. THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD OWES A FIDUCIARY DUTY 
TO APPELLANT 
A fiduciary is one who not only occupies a position of trust, but, because of 
superior knowledge, position or power, must exercise a higher level of care and diligence. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 7th ed. (1999). In essence, a fiduciary is a person with a 
duty to act primarily for the benefit of another. Russell, et al v. Lundberg, et al, 120 
P.2d 541, (Utah App. 2005). In First Security Bank of Utah N.A. v. Banberry Dev. 
Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1333 (Utah 1990), the Court phrased it this way: UA fiduciary 
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relationship imparts a position of peculiar confidence placed by one individual in 
another." 
There is little doubt that the Board is a fiduciary as respects all plan recipients 
including non-employee spouses. Utah Code Ann. §49-13-104 establishes the Public 
Employee Non Contributory Retirement Trust Fund. Section 49-1 l-203(l)(f) defines the 
Board as an investment trustee of the Investment Fund. It is charged to maintain systems, 
plans and programs on an actuarial basis. Section 49-1 l-203(l)(g). Section 49-11-
103(2) states: "This title shall be liberally construed to provide maximum benefits and 
protection consistent with sound fiduciary and actuarial principals." Under § 49-11-
203(1 )(p) (Board Powers and Duties), the Board is mandated not to take any action in 
conflict with the Board's trust and fiduciary duties. 
The courts have made the Board's fiduciary role unwaivering. In Eldredge v. 
Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671, 676 (Utah App. 1990), in an action for 
estoppel, where a significant misrepresentation had been made by a Board staff 
employee, the court elaborated on the importance of the fiduciary duty when conveying 
information. 
The critical nature of the irrevocable, once-in-a-lifetime 
retirement decision of a public employee imposes a strict duty 
of certitude upon those charged with the supervision and 
implementation of the system. A governmental body, 
charged with as important a function as the administration of 
public employees retirement system bears a stringent duty to 
abstain from giving inaccurate or misleading advice. 
While the Eldredge admonition is in the affirmative - what not to say or represent, 
equally unjustifiable, equally damaging and equally irreversible, is the failure to warn, or 
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withhold, critical information to a class of putative widows when they are the most 
vulnerable. In contrast to operating at a "stringent duty" level to ensure that an employee 
is completely armed with all the facts during his "irrevocable once-in-a-lifetime" 
retirement decision, the chief administrator of the program, Judy Lund, seems nonchalant 
and completely passive. She testified at the hearing: "Well, basically once we have the 
application and if everything's valid we presume the member has selected the plan he or 
she wishes and that's it. I mean we're not going to contact them again to confirm what 
the member has already selected." (Tr. pp. 32-33) (emphasis added). 
VI. THE BOARD ERRED IN NOT CREDITING THE UNCONTRADICTED 
TESTIMONY THAT APPELLANT'S HUSBAND INTENDED TO PROVIDE FOR 
A SURVIVOR BENEFIT. 
With respect to the evidentiary record, the Utah State Retirement Board failed to 
decide a critical issue, or silently assumed it adversely to Appellant, in that it made no 
finding regarding the deceased retiree's actual belief as to whether the selection of Plan 1 
would deprive Appellant of retirement benefits upon his death. The uncontradicted 
evidence before the Board was that prior to his death the decedent unequivocally told his 
wife that his retirement plan option provided for her substantially in the event of his death 
(R.T. 9). At the hearing, this testimony was received without objection when offered into 
evidence. Second, even if a timely objection had been lodged, it would not have been 
inadmissible hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted 
(i.e. that he really had selected a different benefit plan), but rather to prove what he 
thought he had done: i.e. selected a plan that protected his family. By failing to object to 
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said testimony, Mrs. Montierth's statements are conclusive and binding upon all parties 
and serve to undercut the conclusion reached by the Board on this issue. 
The findings in Paragraph No. 11 read: "Petitioner failed to provide any evidence 
outside of her testimony that Mr. Montierth mistakenly selected retirement Plan 1 and 
meant to select another retirement plan on his Application." As support, the Board cites 
mistakenly Utah Code §63-46b-10(3) ("A finding of fact that was contested may not be 
based solely on hearsay evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules 
of Evidence"). The problem, of course, is that there was no "contested evidence" and 
thus §63-46b-10(3) is not applicable. Had there been an objection, Petitioner could have 
produced a plethora of evidence (insurance documents, car titles, real estate titles, general 
lifestyle orientation) demonstrating the manner in which she and her husband held all 
property and the decedent's lifelong devotion to his family's care and future as a High 
Priest in the LDS Church. 
In essence, the ALJ and the Board ignored the "hearsay" evidence in direct 
contravention of Utah's Administrative Procedures Act. Utah Code Ann., § 63-46b-
8(1 )(c) states "The Presiding Officer may not exclude evidence solely because of 
hearsay1'. The Utah Supreme Court has "repeatedly held that the hearsay rule does not 
apply in administrative hearings." Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 696 
(Utah 1980). 
The failure to consider hearsay rises to the level of constitutional denial. 
The manner in which the judge conducted the hearing 
was unacceptable. First, the administrative law judge inserted 
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a strict application of the hearsay rule, although that rule does 
not apply in administrative hearings. 
This error contributed to constitutional denial of a fair 
hearing. 
Bunnell v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1987). 
On a separate and distinct basis, the "Application For Service Retirement," the key 
document in issue, is clearly misleading and was never completed, rendering its legal 
efficacy in serious doubt. "Plan 1" is referred to as the "unmodified plan," which the 
average person would assume to be the normal-survivorship-rights-to-spouse retirement 
product. It is true that the plans are described on the reverse side of the document, with a 
signature line to certify that a counselor has reviewed (and presumably explained) the 
plans. This line remains unsigned, however, leaving the record in serious doubt that the 
application was ever completed legally. Accordingly, neither a contract nor a legally 
binding "election" between the State and Petitioner's spouse was ever made, rendering 
the purported "election" null and void. 
VII. THE APPELLANT HAS NOT WAIVED HER RIGHT TO BRING THESE 
ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT 
It is likely that the Appellee, or the court sua sponte, will raise the issue of waiver 
as regards the constitutional issues brought before it here. In Utah, as in other 
jurisdictions, the general rule is that waiver is applicable when an issue was not raised 
below. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, (Utah App. 1990). It is equally clear, however, that 
well recognized exceptions easily provide a platform for review at this appellate stage. 
Espinalv. Salt Lake City Board of Education, 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990) (limited 
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exceptions are available). Two exceptions are frequently identified in Utah: (1) if the 
trial court committed "plain error" or (2) exceptional circumstances. State of Utah v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, (Utah 
1987). It also has been suggested that the error below must be obvious and "harmful". 
State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, (Utah 1990). Another court, State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 121-22 (Utah 1989), held that manifest injustice was the same as "plain error." In 
State of Utah v. Archambeau, supra at 926, after reviewing the history of the waiver 
exception the court advanced an overarching principle: "We conclude that the 'plain 
error' and 'exceptional circumstances are sufficiently broad to encompass any situation 
requiring Utah's appellate courts to consider a constitutional issue for the first time on 
appeal in the interest of justice." 
An expansive collection of judicial exceptions to the general waiver rule is 
cataloged in an excellent article entitled The Thirteenth Review of Criminal Procedure: 
Introduction and Guide for Users, 89 Georgetown L.J. 1783 (2001). Matters not raised 
below, and routinely barred, are failures to object to evidence, to jury instructions, to 
perceived jury bias, motions to suppress evidence, requests for discovery and motions to 
exclude prior convictions. Id. at 1797, and cases cited therein. Significantly, errors of a 
constitutional nature are more likely to be considered plain error. Id. at 1807. 
Commonly applied judicial exceptions would include futility, plain error affecting a 
substantial right, the need to prevent grave injustice or a miscarriage of justice, and error 
seriously affecting the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. 
text at pp. 1803-1807, and footnotes, 2431-2435, with the supporting decisions. 
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And with respect to the futility exception, in one of the few appellate cases to deal 
with Utah's Retirement Board, the appellate court made it known that it pays little 
attention to the Retirement Board's legal conclusions. "The standard of review on appeal 
from final agency action dealing with statutory interpretation presents an issue of law, 
and we therefore apply a correction-of-error standard where we extend no deference to 
the agency's conclusions." Gottfredson v. Utah State Retirement Board, 808 P.2d 153, 
154 (Utah App. 1991) (emphasis added). See also, Horton v. Utah State Retirement 
Board, 842 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah App. 1992) to the same effect (no deference to the 
agency's decision). 
Conversely, if a statutory or constitutional issue is not raised below, and if the 
court believes there is some value in having the Board deal with it initially, the court will 
remand, not dismiss. Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 1238 
(Utah 1980), "We reverse and remand the case to the lower court for reference to the 
retirement board." Adding to the futility argument, Johnson sanguinely observed that 
"administrative agencies do not generally determine the constitutionality of their organic 
legislation." Id. at 1237. 
In the special context before this Honorable Court, we advance four reasons to 
invoke the exception: (1) there is great harm to a widow and four children who received 
no notice that their right to the annuity had been extinguished whether mistakenly, or 
deliberately, by Appellant's suicide-bound husband; (2) the futility of arguing before the 
Board that its "election scheme," and administration, was unconstitutional; (3) the 
importance to all putative widows in the State of Utah that their constitutional right to 
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notice and opportunity to be heard fastens inextricably to any decision that may effect 
their vested property interest in retirement benefits; and (4) to correct this manifest 
injustice. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant requests either: (1) that the Application 
for Service Retirement be disregarded as incomplete and legally ineffective, and that her 
2005 request to receive the annuity be granted under §49-13-405(2); or alternatively, (2) 
that the legislative and administrative scheme here discussed be declared 
unconstitutional, that the Board be reversed, and that the ALJ be ordered to grant 
Appellant her annuity; or in the event the Court seeks the Board's view of the 
constitutional issues raised in this proceeding, (3) that a remand to the Administrative 
Law Judge be made pursuant to Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 
(Utah 1980). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 i i _ day of January, 2006. 
Dennis A. GladwettC 
David L. Knowles L.J) 
Attorneys for Appellant, Kathy Montierth 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that three true and correct copies of the foregoing OPENING 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT KATHY MONTIERTH and of the Addenda that follow this 
page, were mailed by first-class mail with postage fully prepaid this QILP day of 
January, 2006, to each of the following: 
David B. Hansen 
Howard, Phillips & Andersen 
560 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Utah State Retirement Board 
Legal Assistant cJ 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
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Y APr dCATION FOR SERVICE RETIREMENT 
Public Employees' Retirement Systems 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Utah Retirement Sys is 
560 East 200 South, Suite 240 
PO Box 1590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841,107159,0 
(801) 366-7770 or ( 8 6 0 ^ 6 9 5 ^ ^ Pr! / : I £ 
FAX (801) 366-7733 ' ' ° 
1
 - Before completing the application, read the information on the reverse side. 
2- All blanks must be completed to process your application. 
3. Please type or print clearly in black ink. Whited out or crossed out areas may invalidate this app 
4. Return both copies (2) of completed form to the Retirement Office. 
5- Section C must be completed to indicate either selection of life insurance or waiver of coverage. 
i=2 I 
SECTION A - PERSONAL INFORMATION 
Name (as it is to be shown on the retirement check) 
lino Address / 
Birth Date (yyyy/mr 
•d. 
Social Security Number
 A L * f 1 
Maili g r  
s&&&£j?>4^£ *£€-< Home Phone 
'*b?^y&r State Zip . Daytime Phone „ ^ ^ ^ 
Marital Status 
• Single • Divorced 
paMarried • Widowed 
D Legally Separated 
Effective Retirement Date (1st or 16th day of month) See reverse side. 
D 1st or J S 16th Month rV%~*f Year QQO j ^ 
Anticipated Last D; 
2,Od Z^/j ;yyyy/mm/dd) ^ 0 
Position Employer/Departmeni/DMsion Current Pay Rate 
Spouse's Name (First, Middle, Last) Birth Date (wyy/mnvdd) Social Seci i l urity Number 
^3Yes D N o Are you in the process of purchasing or redepositing service? <z**~t<*^&<*&<3 
D Yes ffifrlo Do you intend to make a purchase or redeposit of service at the time of your retirement? 
• Yes > & N o Have you taken a leave of absence during your career, such as a sabbatical leave? 
If you intend to make a purchase or redeposit, it must be completed before your effective retirement date. 
*tti>-3>/-3ogj/ 
SECTION B - RETIREMENT PLAN 
I want to receive my retirement allowance under the provisions of the plan selected below. 
(See plan description on the back of this form.) 
j £ [ Plan 1 (Unmodified) • Plan 2 • Plan 3 Joint Life Q Plan 4 Joint Life • Plan 5 Joint Life 
If Plan 2 is selected, the retiree must designate primary and contingent beneficiaries on Form RTCF-1. 
D Plan 6 Joint Life 
SECTION C - RETIREE AND SPOUSE LIFE INSURANCE 
I agree to the conditions of enrollment as set forth by the Utah State Retirement Board and authorize deduction of the required premiums. 
Retiree Coverage • $3,000 • $5,000 Q $10,000 
Spouse Coverage Q $3,000 • $5,000 • $10,000 
WAIVER OF COVERAGE OF RETIREE OR SPOUSE LIFE INSURANCE 
^ S I do not elect to enroll in the retiree coverage. 
I do not elect to enroll in spouse coverage. i 
SECTION D - SIGNATURE 
In accordance with the statutes governing the Utah Retirement Systems, I make application for retirement benefits. I understand 
the limitations as described on the reverse side of this form. I hereby certify that the information provided on this form and any of 
the attached forms is true, correct, and complete to the best of my knowledge. I hereby authorize representatives of the Utah 
Retirement Systems to verify any or all of the information submitted. I hereby acknowledge and agree that any false or misleading 
Information submitted on this form or on any attached forms may subject me to personal liability and the Utah Retirement 
Systems may exercise its rights against me if damaged by false or misleading information submitted by me. 
Membaf s Sj Date _ 
ZLbQ?^ 
NOTARIZATION / 
\JOibt ^q/UL^ 
IREMENT OFFICE USE 
IHtU^ COUNTY OF STATE OF 
On the day of. . , the above-named 
applicant known to be the indivraual herein, personally appeared before me and 
acknowledged to me that he/she read, understood*, and executed the same of 
his/her own freewill and choice without any undue influence. My commission 
Fund / v? Employer No. 0 ( 0 
Life Insurance Cost Retiree * 
D E F T spouse **"* 
• Birth Certrf icate(s) Q Marriage Certificate 
RETURN BOTH COPIES (2) TO THE RETIREMENT OFFICE A 
/ 
Explanation Of Retirement Plans 
Any member who qualifies for service retirement may retire by applying in writing to the Retirementjrffffc^stating the 
proposed effective date of retirement, which may not be more than 90 days before or after the datef ^ fappteaft^n and 
which shall be effective on the 1st or 16th day of the month as selected by the member, but must b e ^ e / / n e j w t Pl^ y of 
actual work. The member must actually terminate employment on or before the retirement date. ^ ^ / K ) 
NOTE: No alteration, addition, or cancellation of a benefit may be made after the date of retirement as set by the 
member in this application. However, there is a three-day rescission period from the date the application is signed di 
which period the member may elect to make a change. 
1. PLAN 1 UNMODIFIED MONTHLY RETIREMENT BENEFIT - Provides an unmodified retirement benefit to the retiree 
for the remainder of the retiree's lifetime. No continuing spouse or other death benefits are paid under this plan. Upon 
the retiree's death only the check covering the month in which the retiree dies is paid to the retiree's estate. 
2. PLAN 2 RETIREMENT BENEFIT - Provides for a slightly reduced allowance (about 5%) to the retiree. Upon the 
retiree's death, any balance in the retiree's own contribution account is paid to the designated beneficiary. The 
beneficiary may be changed at any time on Form RTCF-1. 
3. PLAN 3 RETIREMENT BENEFIT - Provides a reduced benefit payable to the retiree during the retiree's lifetime, and 
upon the retiree's death, provides the same benefit to the lawful spouse designated at the time of retirement. The 
beneficiary cannot be changed after the retirement date. 
4. PLAN 4 RETIREMENT BENEFIT - Provides a reduced benefit payable to the retiree during the retiree's lifetime, and 
upon the retiree's death, provides one half the same benefit to the lawful spouse designated at the time of retirement. 
The beneficiary cannot be changed after the retirement date. 
5. PLAN 5 RETIREMENT BENEFIT - Provides a reduced benefit payable to the retiree during the retiree's lifetime, and 
upon the retiree's death, provides the same benefit to the lawful spouse designated at the time of retirement Should 
the spouse die first, the retiree's plan will revert to the maximum monthly retirement benefit under Plan 1. Plan 5 
provides a slightly lower benefit than Plan 3. A member retiring under Plan 5 who subsequently divorces may elect to 
convert the present value of the remaining benefit at the time of divorce to an actuarially equivalent benefit under 
Plan 1 if there is no court order to the contrary. 
6. PLAN 6 RETIREMENT BENEFIT - Provides a reduced benefit payable to the retiree during the retiree's lifetime, and 
upon the retiree's death, provides one half the same benefit to the lawful spouse designated at retirement. Should the 
spouse die first, the retiree's plan will revert to the maximum monthly retirement benefit under Plan 1. Plan 6 provides 
a slightly lower benefit than Plan 4. A member retiring under Plan 6 who subsequently divorces may elect to convert 
the present value of the remaining benefit at the time of divorce to an actuarially equivalent benefit under Plan 1 If 
there is no court order to the contrary. 
NOTE: If the member chooses Plan 1 and dies within 90 days after the effective date of retirement, the member's 
retirement will be canceled and the account settled as a death before retirement. 
The following Retiree Life Insurance fs a term life insurance and may be taken in addition to the regular 
retirement plan selected: 
Life insurance for the retiree and spouse is available in the amounts of $3,000, $5,000, or $10,000. The premiums will be 
deducted from the retiree's retirement benefit. If life insurance for a spouse has been selected and the retiree dies, no 
further premium is due for the spouse's life insurance. Election to participate in this program is irrevocable. If the retiree 
or spouse dies in the first three years after retirement, a reduced life insurance payment will be paid to the designated 
beneficiary(ies). 
The above statements and options have been reviewed with me by a counselor. 
Member's Signature Date 
r&te ft 0& 4ifiK>: /* **£%-" & Page 2 RTRT-3 R*V. 10/26/2001 
ADDENDUM NO. 2 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
KATHY MONTIERTH on Behalf of 
Wesley Moatierth (Deceased), 
Petitioner, 
v. : 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Respondent : 
: FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
File#:05-06R 
Hearing Officer: Barker 
A hearing was held on August 22, 2005, before the Adjudicative Hearing Officer on 
Petitioner's Request for Board Action. Petitioner was represented by Rocky D. Crofts. The 
Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") was represented by David B. Hansen. Based upon the 
evidence in this matter and the legal memoranda submitted, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer 
rendered a decision in favor of the Board. The Adjudicative Hearing Officer now makes the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Wesley V. Montierth ("Mr. Montierth) was a member of the Public Employees 
Noncontributory Retirement System OTERS"). 
1 
PERS is administered by the Utah State Retirement Office ("Office"). 
Prior to his retirement, Mr, Montierth requested and received three Retirement 
Benefit Estimates ("Estimates"). 
On August 16,2002, Mr. Montierth filed an Application for Service Retirement 
("Application") with the Office for a July 16,2002, retirement date. 
On his Application, Petitioner selected retirement "Plan 1." 
On August 16,2002, Mr. Montierth had his signature on his completed 
Application notarized by Ms. Ann Hancock Young, a retirement counselor. 
Mr. Montierth's signed Application states in part: 
In accordance with the statutes governing the Utah Retirement Systems, I 
make application for retirement benefits. I understand the limitations as 
described on the reverse side of this form. I hereby certify that the 
information provided on this form and any of the attached forms is true 
correct, and complete to the best of my knowledge. 
For 27 months, Mr. Montierth and Kathy Montierth ("Petitioner") received and 
benefited from a Plan 1 retirement benefit, which provided substantially more in 
retirement benefits than any other retirement plan benefit. 
Mr. Montierth passed away on October 20,2004. 
Petitioner is the surviving spouse of Mr. Montierth. 
Petitioner failed to provide any evidence outside of her testimony that Mr. 
Montierth mistakenly selected retirement Plan 1 and meant to select another 
retirement plan on his Application. 
2 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(4) provides that Petitioner bears the burden of proof in this 
matter. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-607(1), states, "After the retirement date, which shall be set by 
a member in the member's application for retirement, no alteration, addition, or 
cancellation of a benefit may be made except as provided in Subsections (2), (3), and (4) 
or other law." 
3. Petitioner failed to provide documentation or testimony which would allow her to change 
Mr. Montierth's retirement plan after his retirement date. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's request to change Mr. Monthierth's 
retirement plan is hereby denied. 
BOARD RECONSIDERATION 
Within ten (10) days of a Board order, any party may file a written request for 
reconsideration stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested as set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. §49-11-613. This filing for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial 
review of the order on review. The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the Board and 
one copy sent by mail to each person making the request. The Board chairman or executive 
director shall issue a written order granting or denying the request within twenty (20) days of 
receipt. If no order is issued within twenty (20) days, the request is denied. 
3 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
If Petitioner is aggrieved with the final Board order, she may seek a judicial review 
within thirty (30) days after the date that the order constituting final Board action is issued. 
Petitioner shall name the Board and all other appropriate parties as respondents. The Utah Court 
of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final Board actions resulting from formal proceedings. 
All petitioners shall follow the procedures established in Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-16. 
DATED this _ _ L i day of August, 2005. 
</J£mes L. Barker, Jr. r 
Adjudicative Hearing Officer 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Denial of the 
Adjudicative Hearing Officer is hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board. 
Dated this £3 day of September, 2005. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
BY 
// John Lunt, Board President 
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iVEDASTOFORM 
/ tocky Crofts 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this the i*-j day ofAugust; 2005,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the above Order, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Rocky Crofts, Esq. 
Smith Knowles 
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden, UT 84403 
David B. Hansen 
Howard, Phillips & Andersen 
560 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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